Progressing Maritime Security Cooperation in the Indian Ocean by Cordner, Lee
Naval War College Review
Volume 64
Number 4 Autumn Article 7
2011
Progressing Maritime Security Cooperation in the
Indian Ocean
Lee Cordner
Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Cordner, Lee (2011) "Progressing Maritime Security Cooperation in the Indian Ocean," Naval War College Review: Vol. 64 : No. 4 ,
Article 7.
Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol64/iss4/7
PROGRESSING MARITIME SECURITY COOPERATION
IN THE INDIAN OCEAN
Lee Cordner
The theme of the second Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), hosted inAbu Dhabi by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) Navy on 10–12 May 2010,
was “Together for the Reinforcement of Maritime Security in the Indian
Ocean.”1 Navy chiefs of service and senior maritime security officers or their
representatives from thirty of the thirty-two Indian Ocean region (IOR) navies
and maritime security forces gathered for this significant event. Participants
from the diverse Indian Ocean littoral came from the Arabian Gulf and the Red
Sea, Africa, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Australia.2 Pakistan, which had de-
clined an invitation to attend the first IONS meeting, in New Delhi in 2008, was
represented by the local air attaché. In addition, extraregional maritime force
participants included the U.S. Navy, represented by Commander, Naval Forces,
U.S. Central Command, Vice Admiral William
Gortney, and the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations,
Vice Admiral Bruce W. Clingan; the Italian Navy, rep-
resented by its chief, Admiral Bruno Branciforte; and
the Royal Navy of the United Kingdom, which sent a
senior delegation. Notable was the absence of partici-
pants from the navies of other external countries with
significant and growing interests in the IOR, for ex-
ample, China, Russia, Japan, and the Republic of
Korea.
The opening ceremony saw India, the founder and
inaugural chair of IONS, represented by Admiral
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Nirmal Verma, the Indian Navy chief, pass chairmanship for the next two years
to his UAE counterpart, Brigadier Naval Staff Ibrahim Salim Mohamed
Al-Musharrakh. Admiral Verma spoke of the vision of IONS bringing regional
navies together for the greater collective good: to enhance safety and security, to
share knowledge, and to support disaster relief and humanitarian assistance for
“the larger benefit of mankind.” Brigadier Al-Musharrakh noted that the con-
cept of security had changed, that it was no longer simply about territory but
now encompassed issues like water availability and the environment. He stated
that trade protection, law and order, regional stability, and the effects of climate
change were key collective-security issues for the region. He emphasized the
need for regional naval forces to work together to ensure that the IOR continued
to be a source of growth and well-being in the face of common threats and
challenges.
Indian Ocean regional maritime security has become a key factor as the IOR
transitions from an international backwater, a mere thoroughfare for maritime
trade, to status as a major global nexus of resource, human, economic, and envi-
ronmental issues. The IONS theme suggested a region moving toward maritime
security cooperation; there was considerable convergence of views on related is-
sues and recognition of the need to take collective approaches.
Moving from a common understanding of issues and aspirations to coopera-
tion to effective action presents enormous challenges. This is particularly the
case for the Indian Ocean, which does not have region-wide security architec-
tures, a common regional identity, a history of regional cooperation, or accepted
regional leadership frameworks. Significant problems are also posed by the need
to recognize the interests and accommodate the involvement of regional powers,
as well as of extraregional powers, like China and the United States. Nonetheless,
emerging strategic and security circumstances in the medium and long terms
dictate a compelling need for effective IOR maritime security cooperation. This
article analyzes the prospects of, and offers ideas for, progressing maritime secu-
rity cooperation in that region.
COMMON INTERESTS, THREATS, RISKS, AND VULNERABILITIES
The international system is fundamentally anarchic, with states acting in accor-
dance with their perceived national interests.3 If progress is to be made toward
effective maritime security cooperation among nation-states, there needs to be a
strong sense that commonly held interests are threatened, at risk, or vulnerable
and that cooperative action among states will help to protect them. States are
most likely to embrace cooperative security measures when there is a compel-
ling, shared belief that the defense of their own interests can be usefully en-
hanced through that course. Pertinent questions that arise include: What are the
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common regional security interests? Whose national interests are affected? How
are those interests threatened? What are the key strategic vulnerabilities? Criti-
cally, how would maritime security cooperation help manage the risks posed?
Short- and long-term regional risk assessments and strategic-level analyses are
required to answer these questions.
The evolving strategic environment in the IOR is profoundly impacted by di-
vergent perceptions about its unique regional political and geographic circum-
stances. For many in this region, especially South Asians, the Indian Ocean has
historically been one of the region’s strongest unifying factors. For centuries, its
waters have carried religions, languages, traditions, and indeed people across
thousands of miles and bound them together in a cultural brotherhood. Accord-
ing to those who hold this view, it is only the failure of the inhabitants to record the
region’s maritime history that has deprived it of the status of a cohesive regional
entity. For most others, however, the IOR appears to be a largely disaggregated
oceanic and littoral zone, more a collection of subregions than a coherent, single
region.4 This view appears to have been reinforced by its division by the United
States between the Pacific, Central, and Africa unified commands, whose tri-
junction is in the northwest Indian Ocean.5
The IOR is demonstrably maritime. The national interests of its states range
from the need to ensure the unfettered flow of maritime trade to support bur-
geoning, or emerging and struggling, economies to the need for effective manage-
ment of the Indian Ocean’s vast “maritime commons,” both national jurisdictions
and high seas.6 It is in the maritime domain that the interests of IOR states largely
converge, and it is at sea that the need for cooperative security is most pressing.7 It
is also at sea that the best opportunities lie to develop mechanisms, and ultimately
habits, of security cooperation that may in the future have application to more
controversial security agendas.
CLIMATE CHANGE, MARINE ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION,
AND OCEAN MANAGEMENT
The direst long-term threats to the collective interests of regional countries and
peoples are nontraditional security risks. The combined impacts of climate
change, environmental degradation, and ocean resource exploitation will pro-
foundly affect the lives of millions in a region where many states have little capa-
bility to manage or respond to them.8
The Impact of Climate Change
The Geneva-based Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has concluded
that the evidence of warming of the global climate system is unequivocal.9 Sea
temperatures of the equatorial areas of the Indian Ocean are rising more quickly
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than elsewhere, and the likelihood of significant variances in the monsoon sea-
son has increased, which could create drought conditions for much of South
Asia. There are increasing incidences of very intense storms, with higher peak
wind speeds and heavier precipitation than has been typical, which could result
in major coastal damage and massive flooding.10 The changing frequency and
intensity of extreme weather events, together with sea-level rise, are expected to
have significantly adverse effects.11
The scale of the potential climate change impact in the IOR is so immense as
to be difficult to comprehend. The region is likely to be faced with a series of ma-
jor weather-related events that, over time, will impose human suffering and en-
vironmental damage that will cumulatively overwhelm and drain response
resources and undermine resilience. The impact will be deeply felt in Asia;12
more than a billion people will have been adversely affected by the 2050s.13 Af-
rica is also very vulnerable.14 The number of people annually subject to flooding
in coastal populations is projected to increase from thirteen million to
ninety-four million, primarily in South Asia and Southeast Asia.15 Millions of
people in low-lying areas of Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, India, Vietnam,
Burma (Myanmar), and Indonesia will be affected. The incidence of increas-
ingly intense tropical cyclones, combined with growing coastal populations, will
result in massive loss of life, damage to property, and large-scale transmigration,
resulting in turn in very frequent requirements for humanitarian assistance and
disaster relief.
Marine Resources. Global warming will also have far-reaching implications for
marine ecosystems.16 The effects of climate change will be compounded by in-
creased competition for and environmental degradation and overutilization of
the ocean’s resources. Illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing is predicted to
increase in the Indian Ocean as stocks in traditional fishing areas are exhausted
and fishermen are forced to move to deeper and more distant waters. There is al-
ready significant evidence of the wider implications of the illegal plundering of
stocks by distant-water fishing fleets off Somalia, for example.17 Local fisheries
are being progressively dispossessed by external enterprises catching marketable
fish, like tuna, to meet international demand.18 These circumstances exacerbate
already tenuous food-security concerns in the IOR.
Maritime Boundary Delimitations. The delimitation of the maritime bound-
aries of many IOR states has not been agreed, although progress is better here
than in some other parts of the world.19 Maritime disputes between adjacent lit-
toral states are likely to occur due to boundary uncertainty and overlapping
claims. There are ocean-management concerns in some areas due to the lack of
clarity over which nations are to exercise rights and accept obligations for
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husbanding, regulating, and enforcing marine zones. Many Indian Ocean states
have submitted extended-continental-shelf claims to the United Nations (UN)
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf; these claims, if established,
will extend the marine zones that require responsible management.20
Maritime and Marine Challenges: Managing the Risks
Many IOR states have little or no capacity to fulfill their responsibilities for man-
aging marine zones effectively. Exploitation, pollution, and water-security in-
fringements will proceed unchecked in many parts of the Indian Ocean, both
under national jurisdiction and in the high seas. Very few regional countries
have the individual capacity to deal with human tragedies and environmental
damage to coastal areas on a massive scale resulting from repeated natural disas-
ters. The overall regional capacity to mitigate the risks from climate change is
grossly inadequate.
The widespread coastal devastation and loss of life caused by the 2004 Asian
tsunami and the 2007 and 2009 Bangladesh cyclones point to the collective human-
security challenges that lie in the future. In those instances, many regional coun-
tries rallied in mutual support; significant response and recovery assistance was
also provided by extraregional nations and organizations.21
The combined effects of climate change and marine environmental degrada-
tion pose profound threats over the medium and long terms to many IOR litto-
ral states. Natural-disaster response and humanitarian aid will demand the
application of resources and the coordination of collective efforts on scales and
at frequencies far beyond anything so far experienced. Related human, food, and
environmental security concerns will be greatly magnified. Vast cooperative re-
sponses will be required that will involve regional and extraregional maritime
security forces.
MARITIME TRADE, ENERGY, AND ECONOMIC SECURITY
Law and order threats to maritime trade that are prevalent in the IOR pose sig-
nificant risks to both regional and extraregional economic and energy security.
The proliferation of failed and failing states in the region adds further dimen-
sions to the security challenges that—along with competition and perhaps con-
flict between regional and extraregional powers, for example, China and
India—could impinge upon freedom of navigation and therefore the flow of
maritime trade.
Energy Supply and Demand. Asia is forecast to experience by far the world’s
greatest increase in energy demand into the medium term.22 China and India’s
proportions of world energy use have greatly increased.23 More than a third of
the world’s oil exports come from the IOR, with the vast majority of known
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reserves in the Arabian Gulf subregion; “energy-surplus nations” have assumed
increased importance in the global economic hierarchy.24 The largest energy-
growth area is in the demand for coal, forecast to grow by 73 percent between
2005 and 2030, most of the increase coming from China and India. Australia is
the world’s largest exporter of coal, with South Africa close behind;25 both coun-
tries ship much of it via the Indian Ocean.
The Indian Ocean Sea-Lanes. The Indian Ocean is now the world’s most impor-
tant route for the movement of long-haul cargo.26 More than 80 percent of the
world’s seaborne trade in oil passes through the Indian Ocean’s choke points:
the straits of Hormuz, Malacca, and Bab el Mandeb.27 In addition to energy, vast
quantities of bulk commodities and manufactured goods are moved by sea as
part of the increasing intra- and extraregional trade.28 The integrity of the In-
dian Ocean sea lines of communication (SLOCs) is vital to global and regional
economic security. In the complicated international shipping and trading con-
text, maintaining the flow of trade is very much in the collective interest of the
world’s nations; to ensure it, cooperative maritime security efforts are required.
Piracy. The current international response to piracy off Somalia presents an ex-
ample of the complexities of maintaining that flow. The multinational nature of
the interests involved is clearly evident, as are the great challenges of dealing
with even a relatively small piracy problem in a vast oceanic area. Despite the re-
quirements of international law for flag states to exercise jurisdiction over ships
and crews, the onus upon all states to repress piracy, ten UN Security Council
resolutions since 2008, and the commitment of naval task forces, the international
community continues to struggle with the problem of piracy off Somalia.29
The incidence of piracy elsewhere in the IOR—for example, the Malacca
Strait—has lessened, due to the combined efforts of littoral and extraregional
nations. The advent of international cooperative entities—including the Re-
gional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery
against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) and, more recently, the Djibouti Code of Con-
duct, aimed to “help address the problem of piracy and armed robbery against
ships off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden”—brings together re-
gional nations and other interested parties to combat piracy.30 Both are coopera-
tive maritime security initiatives; however, there are some significant differences
between them. ReCAAP is supported by Asian nations with capable maritime
security regimes and some history of cooperation. The Djibouti Code of Con-
duct nations, in contrast, have very limited maritime security capabilities and
little experience of cooperation.
Maritime Terrorism. The likelihood of terrorist attacks continues to be a major
concern;31 the IOR retains the dubious distinction of being one of the world’s
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sanctuaries for violent extremism.32 Although the threat of terrorist attack on
shipping remains relatively low, it must be taken seriously, and some incidents
have occurred in the IOR.33 The terrorist threat at sea must be viewed as credible;
major attacks can disrupt global security and the global economy.
In recent years, the need to counter that threat has led to substantial changes
in the international maritime security environment. The International Ship and
Port Facility Security Code and the Suppression of Unlawful Acts conventions
and protocols have profoundly improved the security preparedness of the inter-
national maritime community, with respect to both ports and shipping.34
Other Threats to Law and Order at Sea. Other law and order issues that threaten
the interests of IOR states include illegal immigration, illegal fishing, marine pol-
lution, and the smuggling of people, drugs, and arms. The protection of maritime
boundaries and the policing of maritime domains are largely the responsibilities
of individual nations. Threats to law and order at sea often have transnational
dimensions—for example, crime and illegal immigration, which require collec-
tive regional or subregional responses. Illegal immigration is likely to increase sig-
nificantly, given the impacts of climate change on burgeoning populations,
combined with local conflicts.
REGIONAL STABILITY
The Indian Ocean region contains a large proportion of the world’s failed and
failing states, including eleven of the twenty states listed in the journal Foreign
Policy’s 2009 “Failed State Index.”35 Parts of the IOR have been labeled the “arc of
crisis”;36 the term “arc of instability” has also been used.37 Conflicts in the Mid-
dle East; political instability and conflict in Yemen, Sudan, and Eritrea; the
“Talibanization” of Pakistan, extending from Afghanistan;38 social unrest in parts
of India; the political polarization in Bangladesh; the prodemocracy movement in
Burma; simmering ethnic tensions after the recently concluded civil war in Sri
Lanka—all these add fuel to the perception of a region riddled with political insta-
bility, actual or potential conflict, and uncertain security.
Somalia is the quintessential failed state, having long disintegrated as a func-
tioning entity. A key consequence is a “yawning maritime security gap off the
Horn of Africa,” both a symptom and a result of the lack of law and order ashore.39
The prospect of the degeneration of other states adjacent to vital international
SLOCs and straits must be seriously considered. The maritime security interests
of regional and extraregional states are likely to be affected if this occurs.
In a related vein, the Mumbai terrorist attacks are symptomatic of a lack of ef-
fective maritime-border control.40 India and (to a lesser extent) Pakistan have
capable naval and other maritime security forces, as do Arabian Gulf states
7
Cordner: Progressing Maritime Security Cooperation in the Indian Ocean
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2011
(Saudi Arabia, Iran, the UAE). Some other countries, however, have small naval
forces of little effectiveness (Yemen, Kenya, and Djibouti, in the western Indian
Ocean), and in many respects the region is a maritime security void. Many IOR
states lack intelligence, early warning, and maritime air surveillance and recon-
naissance or the coordinated maritime security patrol and response capabilities
necessary to exercising sovereign control over their maritime domains. The lack
of national capabilities is exacerbated at regional and subregional levels by the
lack of cooperative bodies to coordinate the use of sparse resources.
Many extraregional countries have significant and legitimate interests to pro-
tect in the IOR. The extensive involvement of the U.S., Chinese, South Korean,
and various European navies in the antipiracy effort off Somalia, for example, is
aimed at protecting a common stake in the free flow of maritime trade. The
United States, Britain, and other Western powers remain deeply engaged in the
Middle East in support of global energy security and in addressing the sources of
Islamist extremism. It can be argued that the involvement of external states
helps to stabilize regional security; in many cases such involvement is essential
to make up for shortfalls in the capabilities of regional states. However, in many
IOR nations that experienced colonial rule it remains easy for politicians to in-
voke the specter of imperialism or “gunboat diplomacy.” External intervention
is not universally welcomed by regional states, and certain types of intervention
are potentially destabilizing. However, realization has dawned, especially since
the 2004 tsunami disaster relief episode, that “cooperative engagement” with
outside powers offers many benefits.
The emergence of China as a maritime power with increasing involvement in
the Indian Ocean has created angst among some IOR states, particularly India.
The Indian-Chinese strategic circumstance, in fact, presents a “security dilem-
ma.”41 New Delhi perceives Chinese involvement as an attempt to strategically en-
circle India.42 The pace and scope of Chinese naval expansion and military mod-
ernization and the lack of transparency with which they have proceeded are
certainly causing concern around the IOR.43 China has extensive and legitimate
interests there, including maritime trade and cooperative relationships with sev-
eral IOR states.44 However, China’s assertion that “it will never seek hegemony or
engage in military expansion now or in the future, no matter how developed it
becomes” is viewed with suspicion in India.45 India too is modernizing and ex-
panding its naval capabilities, which it seeks to justify because of its extensive
coastline and maritime domain and broadened interests in IOR security and
freedom of the seas.46
India’s relationships with China are characterized as “cooperative at present
but there is a competitive rivalry in trade and power projection.”47 Some analysts
consider that a potentially dangerous security situation is developing between
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the two great Asian powers.48 Strategic competition is likely to be played out
largely at sea.
All parties with security interests in the IOR are likely to benefit from coopera-
tion to manage the challenges presented by failed and failing states, as well as by
great-power competition, with its attendant potential for miscalculation. Present
circumstances represent compelling reasons why IOR states should collaborate
among themselves and with extraregional states to promote regional stability.
MARITIME SECURITY COOPERATION
The case for cooperative security in the Indian Ocean region, then, is driven
primarily by extreme vulnerability to the combined impacts of climate change and
environmental degradation. This situation presents dire consequences over the
medium and long terms for both regional and extraregional countries. Signifi-
cantly, environmental security–related interests converge in the maritime
domain.
A Compelling Case for Maritime Security Cooperation
The threats posed are insidious. There is unlikely to be a single defining moment
that will galvanize collective action—and herein lies a major difficulty. Without
a stark and immediate threat, like the prospect of global nuclear war during the
Cold War period, persuading political leaders to act upon cooperative responses
will present major difficulties. But unless regional and extraregional leaders ex-
ercise vision and imagination and take early, proactive action, crises will inevita-
bly arise of enormous and unmanageable proportions, and only highly
inefficient, largely ineffective, and essentially inadequate reactive responses will
be available. The hard lessons will ultimately be learned by the international
community, but it will be too late in many respects. Regrettably, it is difficult to
avoid a pessimistic sense that late and ineffectual reaction is the most realistic
and likely scenario.
The outcomes will be costly—financially, environmentally, and morally, in
terms of human misery and lives. The threats to maritime trade security and en-
ergy security will also significantly affect the interests of external and regional
nations. In the IOR, threats to the economic, environmental, and human secu-
rity interests of regional and external countries have already grown to the extent
that the common interests—especially in the maritime realm—of maintaining a
stable region have become paramount.
Conversely, however, maritime security issues in the IOR could, if managed
astutely and prudently, bind a diverse and largely disaggregated region. The
maritime and marine context provides the opportunity for nations to cooperate
to protect common interests—against a range of vulnerabilities that no single
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state has the power to mitigate effectively—without significantly compromising
territorial integrity or sovereignty. The risks posed in the maritime context are
huge and must be faced, but in cooperative security terms they represent the
“low-hanging fruit” that offer the potential for rapid and mutually beneficial ac-
tion. Dealing with them could catalyze habits of region-wide cooperation that
might arguably be applicable to harder and more sensitive security issues, like
arms control and territorial, ethnic, ideological, and religious disputes ashore.49
Risk Management
Managing the risks posed by an environment beset with uncertainty needs to be
at the core of cooperative security in the IOR. Risk management is fundamen-
tally about a structured approach to uncertainty. The international standard
ISO 31000:2009—Risk Management: Principles and Guidelines presents a com-
prehensive framework that is intended to help “ensure that risk is managed ef-
fectively, efficiently and coherently . . . in a systematic, transparent and credible
manner.”50 A formal, strategic risk-management approach would be useful in
defining the magnitude of challenges and identifying mitigation options. In a
regional, cooperative context, the hard questions to be addressed include: How
will risks be recognized? Who has the capability, capacity, and will to respond?
What cooperative arrangements and mechanisms are needed? What would be
the consequences of doing nothing?
Governments are increasingly applying risk-management approaches to stra-
tegic issues. The international risk-management standard offers an internation-
ally accepted framework, a systemized approach to dealing with regional security.
An independent, collaborative, and authoritative regional risk assessment would
help inform IOR and external nations about the scale of the risks being faced
and options for addressing them. In the maritime domain, a regional maritime-
security risk assessment represents a way to initiate cooperation. Such a proposal
would need regional champions and a deal of support from extraregional nations
to proceed.
How Are IOR Maritime-Security Cooperative Arrangements to Be Developed?
Deciding the nature of cooperative arrangements and devising methodologies
to achieve cooperative agendas present serious problems and pose many ques-
tions. What is meant by “maritime security cooperation”? What are the desir-
able extent and scale of cooperation? Who needs to participate? To what extent
should extraregional nations and forces be involved? How can regional and
extraregional capabilities be effectively coordinated in the common interest?
Who has the capability and capacity to contribute, and who should do so? Who
is responsible, and who will pay? Where are capability and capacity lacking?
What alternate options and models for cooperation need to be considered? For
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example, do we need standing, combined naval forces and formal agreements, or
will loose coalitions of the willing assembled on ad hoc bases suffice? Are there
lessons to be drawn from security cooperation in other regions? What are the
risks associated with various possible courses of action versus the risks of inac-
tion? What international instruments are in place (e.g., the 1982 UN Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea), and to what extent have these been adopted by
regional states? Do these instruments aid or impede cooperation? What leader-
ship structure would accommodate most appropriately the aspirations and con-
cerns of both regional and extraregional participants? Importantly, what
maritime security cooperative arrangements are likely to be achievable in
practice?
It is much easier to ask such questions than to formulate acceptable, work-
able, and achievable solutions in the IOR context. Real progress toward mari-
time security cooperation is likely to be torturous, slow, and frustrating.
MECHANISMS FOR COOPERATION: EXPLORING OPTIONS
The distinct nature of the geostrategic environment must be at the core of any
cooperative-security considerations. The circumstances of the Indian Ocean re-
gion are in many respects quite different from those of the Atlantic or Pacific, for
example. In the IOR, the concept of regionalism is not well developed. The dis-
parate and disaggregated subregional IOR geography, lack of common region-
wide historical integration and identity, and an absence of accepted regional
leadership represent considerable obstacles. The Indian Ocean is too big, too di-
verse, and too important and the challenges too large to be dominated or
“owned” by any single nation or small group.
There is a strongly held view in some states, particularly India, that the re-
sponsibility for IOR maritime security should rest primarily with the regional
states. However, as outlined earlier, most of them lack the capacity, whereas ex-
ternal powers have both the capacity and interests to protect; they need, there-
fore, to be constructively engaged. For reasons of identity, security and
long-term stability, and to take account of regional peculiarities, some tailor-
made version of regional cooperation must be devised.51 International regimes
that are self-generated and based on negotiation are likely to offer the greatest
utility and the greatest chances of success for the IOR, in terms of legitimization
and regional cooperation.52
Does ARF Provide a Useful Model for the IOR? The ASEAN (Association of
Southeast Asian Nations) Regional Forum, focused primarily on the western Pa-
cific and East Asia, may provide a model to work from.53 ARF has been operating
for sixteen years and provides a forum for nation-to-nation dialogue on political
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and security issues. In some respects, ARF represents a strategic and security
parallel to Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).54 Notably, however, In-
dia and Pakistan are participants in ARF but not of APEC. Neither ARF nor
APEC is a formal alliance or treaty arrangement; both are nonbinding forums
for dialogue and cooperation. ARF includes the major Pacific powers—the
United States, China, India, Japan, and Russia—both Koreas, Australia, and
many smaller states. Importantly, ARF has established a very active agenda for
discussion of security-related matters.
However, there are significant factors that make direct translation to the IOR
less than ideal. ARF has at its core ASEAN, originally established in 1967, a col-
lection of ten mainly small (except for Indonesia) Southeast Asian states; there is
no IOR equivalent.55 Given the Indian Ocean geography, there are several subre-
gional groups that would need to be accommodated. Participation by external
countries with significant interests in IOR maritime security, like the United
States, China, France, Japan, and Russia, could be envisaged for an IOR version
of ARF. However, underpinning ARF is a web of bilateral and multilateral formal
security alliances between the United States and many western Pacific states;
that is not the case, at least to the same extent, in the IOR.
CSCAP. The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific in many respects
parallels and feeds directly into the ARF and other official regional-security and
defense forums.56 This “Track 2” entity performs a very useful function in en-
abling sensitive and controversial issues to be informally discussed by experi-
enced former diplomats, officials, and academics, generating proposals that can
be put forward to official forums and regional governments for consideration.57
CSCAP includes four IOR states: India, Australia, Indonesia, and Thailand, but
there is currently no similar Track 2 organization to deal with security-related
matters specifically in the IOR. Creation of such an entity would be worth
consideration.
Does NATO Offer Lessons Relevant to the IOR? NATO, of course, was devised in
the context of the Cold War; it is a formal security alliance originally created to
coordinate U.S. and European responses to the threat of invasion and potential
nuclear war with the former Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact. The clear, compel-
ling, and immediate threat to the survival of Western Europe drove the need for
formal cooperative security arrangements. The shared history of two world wars
and the key leadership role of the United States have been central to NATO.
Strong political and military leadership and a cooperative approach generated
by a shared sense of threat to individual interests have been essential. There
would seem to be little in common with the evolving situation in the IOR. In any
case, NATO’s journey of over sixty years highlights the challenges of building,
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gaining, and maintaining consensus between nation-states in a formal alliance
even with survival at stake.
What about the IOR-ARC and Other Existing Regional Entities? The Indian
Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation is cited by some analysts as
potentially meeting the need for an IOR security forum.58 However, it does not
currently encompass all the key players.59 Its charter is to facilitate and promote
economic, business, and cultural cooperation by bringing together government,
business, and academia. It specifically does not deal with security matters, al-
though piracy off Somalia has been discussed in the context of trade implica-
tions.60 In fact, senior Indian officials have been outspoken about the
ineffectiveness of the IOR-ARC.61 There may be an opportunity to revitalize it
when India assumes the chair (and Australia the vice chair) during 2011–12, and
when Australia succeeds India 2013–14.62 However, the charter, national mem-
berships, participants (including government ministers and officials), and the
nature of IOR-ARC business would need to be significantly changed if political,
strategic, and security issues were to be included.
How Useful Is IONS? The emerging role of the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium,
along the lines of that of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS), repre-
sents useful progress toward regional maritime security cooperation.63 How-
ever, in the absence of something akin to the Track 1 ARF, perhaps supported by
the Track 2 CSCAP—to work security, strategy, and policy issues at head-of-
government, senior-minister, senior-official, and academic levels—IONS is
likely to facilitate only minor and relatively low-level, navy-to-navy cooperation.
Such issues as regional strategic-risk assessments, national security policies,
rules of engagement, and multinational strategic and operational directives, and
regional security regimes, arrangements, and agreements need to be considered
at and directed from national political levels. As does WPNS, IONS may usefully
consider and coordinate issues like military and naval doctrine, naval proce-
dures and training, and technological compatibility (protocols, information
technology connectivity, logistics). But WPNS took many years to evolve to the
stage where worthwhile multilateral naval exercises and training were possible,
and IONS is currently well short of achieving this.
At the second IONS meeting, in Abu Dhabi, much useful discussion occurred
on a range of naval professional, technical, and tactical matters. There was also a
well supported session that discussed development of a common maritime se-
curity strategy. However, in the final plenary, involving only the lead national
representatives, a proposal that this idea be pursued gained no support. There
was no appetite even for preliminary work that would inform the possibility of
common strategic perspectives. IONS is the wrong level for such matters; they
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lie more appropriately with governments. There appeared to be reluctance in the
fledgling IONS to move too quickly. Notably, India, the originator of IONS, ap-
peared to adopt a conservative and low-key approach to the future agenda.
Subregional Structures. There are several subregional entities in the IOR that
have limited, subregionally based membership; examples are the South Asian
Association for Regional Cooperation, the Southern African Development
Community, and the Gulf Cooperation Council.64 These entities generally do
not address security issues and would be unlikely to form the basis for the evolu-
tion of IOR-wide maritime security cooperation. The key leaders of each of these
subregional groupings could, however, play critical roles in devising a region-
wide way ahead.
{LINE-SPACE}
Moving toward collective maritime security and common maritime security
strategies requires active engagement at the highest political levels. In the IOR,
India needs to play a key leadership role. However, India appears to be more
comfortable in bilateral relationships with the United States and others and ap-
pears reluctant to take a collective-security leadership role. Other key regional
and subregional states—for example, Australia, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, and
Indonesia—have the potential to perform vital leadership roles and need to be
engaged. The core leadership of IOR security initiatives needs to come from
within the IOR, at least initially.
NEW IOR SECURITY DIALOGUE FORUMS
Forging a way ahead for maritime security in the Indian Ocean region is not go-
ing to be easy. Current mechanisms are at best fragmented and incomplete.
There may be suspicion toward external powers in some quarters and a lack of
willingness to engage with them. Similarly, external powers may well differ
among themselves as to what cooperative IOR security arrangements should be
supported. The nature of the IOR and the maritime security risks it faces mean
that a region-wide entity would need to accommodate both regional and key
extraregional countries.
Options that represent the status quo could be attractive to some parties
—they could wait and do nothing. Regrettably, this may be the most likely out-
come. But waiting until crises emerge offers the lowest likelihood of mitigating
the emerging risks. Another and related option would be to continue to rely
upon ad hoc “coalitions of the willing” to deal with crises as they arise. This reac-
tive approach has been applied to maritime security challenges to date—for ex-
ample, antipiracy operations off the Horn of Africa and responses to the
Indonesian tsunami and other natural disasters. Like the “do nothing” option, it
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gives little hope of dealing effectively with the massive maritime security-related
risks anticipated to beset the IOR in the future.
Both options would ensure that the results of attempts to prevent, respond to,
and recover from the massive human and environmental tragedies of the kinds
forecast would be suboptimal. Responses to crises would remain inadequate due
to the lack of mechanisms to coordinate action, including training, collective
learning, and the sharing of capabilities. They would also allow some regional
states, and extraregional states in certain cases, to abrogate their responsibilities
to control effectively the marine areas under their national jurisdiction and to
protect their maritime security interests.
Creating an informal IOR dialogue and policy discussion entity (that is,
Track 2), similar to CSCAP in concept, would be a good first step. A possible
foundation for such an entity, if appropriately supported and resourced, would
be the Indian Ocean Research Group (IORG), which has been operating for sev-
eral years.65 The IORG leadership comes primarily from India and Australia,
with participants from numerous regional as well as external nations. It brings
together academics and former senior officials from a broad range of back-
grounds, including security and strategy. The key objective of IORG is “to initiate
a policy-oriented dialogue, in the true spirit of partnership, among govern-
ments, industries, [nongovernmental organizations] and communities, toward
realizing a shared, peaceful, stable and prosperous future for the Indian Ocean
region.”66 Its published materials suggest it would be well placed to fulfill the
need for a Track 2 security-policy forum. The first task of an invigorated IORG
could be to develop policy options for progressing maritime-security risk as-
sessment and cooperation.
But as argued above, a Track 1 entity along the lines of ARF but tailored specifi-
cally to IOR circumstances—to the region’s unique nature, character, and
needs—would appear to be necessary as well. An entirely new entity would appear
to offer a greater likelihood of success than an attempt to graft national and regional-
security agendas upon the IOR-ARC, which has an unfortunate reputation for
impotence. There would be significant benefit in creating a fresh regional-
security forum, one that begins with recognition of the massive regional security
challenges that lie ahead, without the burdens of association with the past.
Once formed, a new Track 1 body would find a number of steps necessary as
matters of urgency and high priority, such as:
• Commissioning a multinational team of “experts” (a research group) to de-
velop proposals for security cooperation in the IOR, with its first priority
being maritime security cooperation, perhaps using IORG as the founda-
tion, augmented and resourced as necessary.
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• Establishing an “eminent persons group” comprising esteemed elders—
“wise men” (and women)—to act as a reference and advisory panel to gov-
ernments and the proposed research group.
The members of both the research group and the reference panel should include
representatives of both IOR and extraregional countries.
The IOR-ARC may be a useful vehicle for initiating these proposals. But who
will champion, support, and fund them? One option would be a “pilot” model, a
“test” entity for maritime security cooperation dialogue. The aim would be to
start small, learn, build trust, engender confidence, and evolve, noting how time
pressures mount. Strong and inspirational leadership is needed to get the ball
rolling. This could initially come from India and Australia, perhaps to be joined
by, say, South Africa, Indonesia, or Saudi Arabia. External countries with signifi-
cant IOR maritime security interests, like the United States, China, France, and
Japan, could be drawn in at an early stage.
There is a compelling, imperative need to develop maritime security cooper-
ation in the Indian Ocean region to address the massive human, economic, envi-
ronmental, and energy security risks of the future. The maritime domain is
where the collective interests and common security concerns of regional and
extraregional states converge. Both regional and extraregional countries—those
with interests in the Indian Ocean and the capacity to assist—need to be in-
cluded in security dialogue and cooperative arrangements. Work should com-
mence immediately.
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62. The Hon. Stephen Smith, Australian Minister
for Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Australia
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MP: Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs,
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ment. Member nations: Australia, Brunei,
Cambodia, Canada, People’s Republic of
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